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“The huge disparity between the well-resourced, cosmopolitan capital, Kath-
mandu, and the still very basic living standards in other parts of the country 
remains glaring.”
The Changing Face of Nepal
MICHAEL HUTT
Over the past thirty years, Nepal has under-gone radical political, social, and cultural transformations. At the beginning of 1990, 
it was a Hindu monarchical state; now it is a secular 
republic governed by a communist party that came 
to power through democratic elections. Between 
the decennial national censuses of 1991 and 2011, 
its population grew from 19 million to 26 million, 
and is now estimated to be around 30 million. In 
1990, the three cities of the Kathmandu valley were 
still separated by expanses of green fields; they now 
form a single, highly congested conurbation. While 
temporary southward migration to seek work in In-
dia has been a tradition among young Nepali men 
for generations, probably a quarter of the country’s 
male working-age population is now in longer-
term employment overseas.
And the geopolitics of the region is shifting. 
Thirty years ago, Nepal lived in India’s economic 
and political shadow. Now China is becoming in-
creasingly involved in the development of Nepal’s 
infrastructure, and Beijing’s political influence in 
the country is growing.
The past three decades of rapid change cannot 
be fully understood without setting them in the 
broader context of Nepal’s modern history, which 
is usually deemed to have begun in 1951, when 
105 years of Rana rule came to an end. The Ra-
nas, a group of interrelated courtier families, had 
usurped power in the mid-nineteenth century, re-
ducing the monarch to a ceremonial figurehead. 
They proceeded to establish an extractive family 
autocracy, which did little to promote basic de-
velopment in Nepal but was more than willing to 
provide the British colonial rulers of India with an 
unending supply of “Gurkha” soldiers and essen-
tial commodities, such as timber. 
It was no coincidence that the Rana regime fell 
soon after the departure of the British from the 
subcontinent. Since that time, there have been 
three distinct periods of Nepali political history: 
the democratic transition of the 1950s, the Pan-
chayat regime of 1962–90, and the period since 
1990, which has featured both democratic politics 
and armed conflict.
Nepali students and political exiles in India 
formed new political parties during the twilight 
years of the Rana regime. The two largest were 
modeled on the Indian National Congress and the 
Communist Party of India. After the removal of 
the Ranas, these new parties, the palace, and the 
feudal landlords of the displaced old order jostled 
for power. 
The Nepali Congress Party, led by the char-
ismatic B. P. Koirala, appeared to have come out 
on top when it won a majority in the elections of 
1959, under a constitution promulgated that same 
year. However, King Mahendra dismissed the Con-
gress government less than two years later, invok-
ing the emergency powers vested in him by the 
constitution. In 1962, he formally established a 
new political system of limited, guided democracy, 
the Panchayat, which was to last for nearly three 
decades. Under this regime, political parties were 
banned, the monarch held all executive powers, 
and development and nation-building were the 
all-encompassing aims of government programs.
Panchayat nationalism set out to homogenize 
Nepal’s national identity around three pillars: the 
monarchy, the Nepali language, and Hinduism. 
The insistence on Nepali as the sole language of 
administration and education was problematic in 
a country where scores of other languages were 
the mother tongues of nearly half the population. 
The characterization of the nation as essentially 
Hindu ignored the presence of large communi-
ties that professed other faiths, most notably Bud-
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dhism. But the regime saw ethnic, sectarian, and 
other sectional sentiment as divisive, and political 
dissent was harshly suppressed. The government 
owned almost all of the country’s news outlets and 
publishing houses, and allowed little space for 
public debate or activism.
Nonetheless, Nepal benefited during this Cold 
War period from its strategic location, and received 
massive quantities of aid from the West. Literacy 
rates and public consciousness of the wider world 
grew by leaps and bounds.
It was in 1990 that Nepal entered the present 
period of (ostensibly) participative, constitution-
al democracy. Since then, there have been many 
complex ebbs and flows in the country’s still un-
finished journey toward equality, inclusion, and 
social justice. In the past three decades, Nepal has 
gone through three constitutions (1990, 2007, 
2015), two mass popular movements for democ-
racy (1990, 2006), the massacre of its royal family 
(2001), a ten-year civil war (1996–2006), and a 
major earthquake (2015). 
All of these events, coupled with the legacies 
of the Rana and Panchayat regimes, feed into the 
social and political environment in Nepal today. 
Thus, it is worth considering the history of the 
past three decades in more detail.
RETURN OF DEMOCRACY
A combination of external and internal pres-
sures led to the eventual collapse of the Panchayat 
system in 1990, when a popular movement broke 
out in opposition to the regime. The uprising was 
provoked by a political dispute with India that 
led to the closure of all but two of the 14 bor-
der crossings between the two countries, causing 
shortages of many essential commodities in Nepal. 
Huge public demonstrations and an increasingly 
violent state response, coupled with international 
pressure, forced King Birendra to dismantle the 
Panchayat system, lift the 30-year-long ban on 
political parties, and allow the reestablishment of 
multiparty democracy.
A generation of politicians who had struggled 
for decades under the Panchayat regime, with 
many spending long spells in jail, felt that their 
time had come. A new constitution reined in the 
king’s authority, but allowed him to retain emer-
gency powers and effective control of the army. 
In 1991, the Nepali Congress party won the first 
general election conducted under this new dis-
pensation. The parliamentary opposition was 
dominated by parties espousing various strands 
of communist ideology, alongside more conser-
vative groupings disgruntled by the constitution-
al changes.
The early 1990s saw a major liberalization of the 
economy, in step with reforms being implemented 
on the other side of the Indian border. Nepal’s new 
constitution granted complete freedom of expres-
sion and publication, prompting the emergence of 
independent newspapers and privately owned FM 
radio stations and television channels. These years 
also saw a major upsurge in civil rights claims by 
marginalized sections of the population—nota-
bly the Adibasi Janajati (“indigenous nationali-
ties”), Madhesis (the people of the southern Tarai 
lowlands), Dalits (the former “untouchables” of 
the Hindu caste hierarchy), and women—whose 
grievances and concerns had been stifled for three 
decades. 
But the new democratic order failed to deliver 
on its promises. The political parties spent most of 
their time and energy competing with one anoth-
er for power, patronage networks, and commis-
sions and kickbacks from externally funded de-
velopment projects and business contracts. They 
showed much less interest in implementing the 
pledges in their manifestos.
MAOIST WAR AND PALACE MURDERS
Communism has been a potent political force 
across much of South Asia since the 1917 October 
Revolution in Russia. After the Moscow-Beijing 
split of the early 1960s, Nepal’s communist move-
ment fragmented. Maoist factions took the most 
radical revolutionary line. 
Support for the Nepali Maoists was fueled by 
growing discontent across the country, particu-
larly among a new generation of school-educated 
youth in hill districts. (Compulsory schooling was 
introduced during the Panchayat period, but the 
education provided in government schools was of 
a low standard, and very few young people from 
marginal hill districts progressed to further or 
higher education.) Their consciousness of the fail-
ure and inequitable outcomes of the government’s 
development programs, the lack of opportunity 
for their own advancement, widespread corrup-
tion in high places, and the continued dominance 
of a high-caste Hindu male elite made the prospect 
of rebellion attractive.
Armed conflict broke out between the Nepal 
Communist Party (Maoist) and the Nepali state, at 
first on a small scale. The rebels staged attacks on 
police posts and other government facilities in the 
midwestern hills in the mid-1990s. Due in part to 
the state’s often brutal and clumsy response, the 
conflict had spread to almost every district of Ne-
pal by 2003. (At the end of the war, the United 
Nations Mission to Nepal reported the presence of 
19,000 former Maoist combatants in the canton-
ments it supervised.)
Halfway through the war, on June 1, 2001, King 
Birendra and his family were massacred in the Na-
rayanhiti Palace in Kathmandu. The official ac-
count of this appalling event blamed Crown Prince 
Dipendra: he was portrayed as a frustrated young 
man who went on a killing spree while highly 
intoxicated. Many Nepalis remain unconvinced 
by that explanation to this day. Public distrust of 
King Gyanendra, who succeeded his brother to the 
throne, played greatly to the rebels’ advantage.
The government mobilized the Royal Nepalese 
Army against the Maoists in November 2001 and 
declared a succession of emergencies that allowed 
the state security forces to act with impunity. The 
new king suspended the parliament and secured 
international funding and sup-
port for what he and his gov-
ernment characterized as an 
extension of the US-led “global 
war on terror.” Over 16,000 
lives were lost during the ten 
years of this war. Both parties 
to the conflict committed se-
vere human rights abuses, including numerous 
cases of torture, extrajudicial execution, and dis-
appearance.
As the war continued to escalate, King Gyanen-
dra attempted to wrest back executive control, 
but failed in his attempt to mount a royal coup 
in 2005, which would have returned Nepal to the 
Panchayat system. Within five years of his succes-
sion to the throne, the new king had succeeded 
in alienating both the mainstream political parties 
and Nepal’s growing civil society to such an extent 
that they came together to make common cause 
with the Maoists against him. These combined op-
position forces launched a second people’s move-
ment for democracy in 2006. They forced the king 
to bow to their demand that he restore the sus-
pended parliament.
The Maoist “People’s War” came to a negotiated 
end that year. The agreement was signed in New 
Delhi by the Maoists and the main parliamentary 
parties. In 2007, an interim constitution was pro-
mulgated and a new national anthem was adopt-
ed—a bright, folksy song celebrating Nepal’s di-
versity, cultural richness, and unity. It replaced the 
paean of praise for the monarchy that had served 
as the Nepali anthem for 82 years.
In 2007, the UN established a mission in Ne-
pal to monitor and support the peace process. In 
the following year, a Constituent Assembly was 
elected to draft a new constitution for a secular, 
democratic, federal state. The Maoists, who had 
renounced armed struggle, confounded all expec-
tations by becoming the largest party. At its first 
meeting, in May 2008, the Assembly voted to abol-
ish the Shah monarchy, making Nepal a republic. 
In June, King Gyanendra, the nation’s last mon-
arch, departed from the palace.
AFTERSHOCKS
Due to a mixture of direct “first past the post” 
elections and proportional representation, the 
Constituent Assembly elected in 2008 was prob-
ably the most representative legislative body ever 
established in South Asia, in terms of its inclusion 
of hitherto marginalized sections of the popula-
tion. However, it was unable to 
agree on a range of key issues, 
including the structure of the 
new federal state, which the 
Maoists and their supporters 
insisted should be determined 
by the geographical distribu-
tion of minority ethnic groups. 
Having failed to deliver a constitution despite four 
extensions of its original two-year term, the first 
Constituent Assembly shut down in May 2012.
After a long and fractious hiatus, a new Constit-
uent Assembly was elected in November 2013. No 
party won an overall majority in these elections, 
but the Nepali Congress emerged as the largest 
contingent and quickly formed an alliance with 
the second largest, the Nepal Communist Party 
(Unified Marxist-Leninist), producing a majority. 
This coalition government, headed by Prime Min-
ister Sushil Koirala of the Congress party, was in 
power when an earthquake with a magnitude of 
7.8 struck central Nepal on April 25, 2015. 
The earthquake, and the hundreds of further 
tremors and aftershocks that followed over the 
next few months, killed almost 9,000 people and 
destroyed nearly 900,000 homes across 31 of the 
country’s 75 districts, as well as many of Nepal’s 
most precious heritage sites. The immediate re-
sponse to the disaster came from citizens (particu-
larly the young), the army, and the Indian govern-
ment. International agencies and donor countries 
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quickly pledged $4.4 billion in emergency aid to 
enable rescue and relief in the short term and re-
construction over a longer period.
For their part, the leaders of the four biggest 
political parties decided that completing the 
constitution should now be prioritized and fast-
tracked. In contrast, the government’s National 
Reconstruction Authority came into being much 
more slowly. The earthquake had clearly provided 
an opportunity for a deeply divided political lead-
ership not only to save its collective face over its 
failure to decide on a new constitution, but also to 
face down minority demands. As a consequence, 
the constitution promulgated on September 20, 
2015, was more conservative than it might have 
been had the earthquake not occurred. Although 
it was greeted with celebrations in the hills, it pro-
voked protests in the plains.
The political leadership of the Madhesis, the 
people of Nepal’s southern lowlands, protested 
that the new constitution had not delivered on the 
long-held promise of a fairer deal for their region. 
Regarded by many hill people 
as essentially being of Indian 
origin, successive generations 
of Madhesis had struggled to 
secure equal rights to citizen-
ship and social and political in-
clusion in Nepal. The new fed-
eral structure did not meet their 
demands for the demarcation of purely Madhesi 
provinces that would encompass the whole of the 
their population. The ensuing protests, and the 
state’s response to them, led to violent clashes and 
over fifty fatalities.
In order to put pressure on the government, 
Madhesi political organizations, with at least some 
measure of Indian support, blockaded the main 
arterial road to Kathmandu. The blockade caused 
severe shortages of key commodities in the capi-
tal, particularly fuel. Clear parallels could be seen 
between this situation and the one that arose in 
1989–90, leading to the first People’s Movement. 
But this time the government, now led by Prime 
Minister Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli of the Nepal 
Communist Party (Unified Marxist-Leninist), as-
serted that the Indian government was orchestrat-
ing the blockade in support of Madhesi demands. 
The government whipped up Nepal’s latent hill 
nationalism, which centers on the Nepali lan-
guage, Hindu religious identity, and the cultures 
of the hills, to support its claims. This led to a seri-
ous deterioration in relations between New Delhi 
and Kathmandu, which took some time to repair, 
and also between the peoples of Nepal’s hills and 
plains.
Despite this turbulence, the government 
forged ahead with the establishment of a new fed-
eral structure. In 2017, candidates were elected 
through both first-past-the-post and proportional 
representation voting systems to local, provincial, 
and national bodies. The new federal system com-
prised seven provinces, delineated on the basis of 
a set of “identity and capability” criteria. (The five 
criteria of identity were ethnicity/community, lan-
guage, culture, geographical and regional conti-
nuity, and history. The four criteria of capability 
were economic interrelationships and capacity, 
the potential for infrastructural development, the 
availability of natural resources, and administra-
tive feasibility.) The newly elected provincial as-
semblies each embarked on the process of de-
ciding the name of its province and choosing its 
capital city.
In the national elections held in November and 
December 2017, the two Com-
munist parties campaigned on 
a common ticket, despite their 
virulent rivalry during the years 
of war. Together they won com-
manding majorities in the na-
tional House of Representatives 
and in all but one of the seven 
provincial assemblies; after the elections, the two 
parties formally merged. Although nominally 
communist, the government’s agenda is seen as 
primarily nationalist and pro-development: sam-
riddha Nepal, or “prosperous Nepal,” is its guiding 
slogan.
UNCERTAIN HARVEST
In at least one sense, then, Nepal’s postwar po-
litical transition is at an end. The new state struc-
tures are in place, and their bodies are populated 
by elected representatives. Of course, it is too early 
to say whether this new dispensation will enhance 
the quality of life for ordinary Nepalis. As a friend 
told me during a recent stay in the country, sanghi-
yata euta khet matrai ho: “federalism is just a field.” 
What it yields will depend on what people plant 
in it.
Many postconflict issues remain unresolved. 
Hundreds of torture victims and the families of 
over 1,000 people who disappeared without a trace 
during the war have waited a long time for justice. 
But redress still appears to be a distant prospect. 
The new democratic 
order failed to deliver 
on its promises.
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In recent months, individuals with cases of alleged 
human rights abuses pending against them in the 
courts have been appointed to senior political po-
sitions.
There are also aspects of the new constitution 
that will surely be contested, in addition to the 
Madhesi grievances. The continued overrepre-
sentation of men from higher Hindu castes in all 
branches of government is one. Gender inequality 
in the acquisition and conferral of citizenship is 
another. Under the 2015 constitution, the power 
of a Nepali to confer citizenship on his or her 
spouse depends on that citizen’s gender. Similar-
ly, a Nepali woman married to a foreign man can 
only secure naturalized citizenship for her child, 
whereas a Nepali man married to a foreign woman 
can pass down citizenship by descent. 
Meanwhile, post-earthquake reconstruction has 
been a slow process. Four years after the estab-
lishment of the National Reconstruction Author-
ity, fewer than two-thirds of the houses destroyed 
by the earthquake have been completely rebuilt. 
Many people are still living in the temporary shel-
ters they erected near the ruins of their homes in 
the immediate aftermath of the 2015 quakes.
The huge disparity between the well-resourced, 
cosmopolitan capital, Kathmandu, and the still 
very basic living standards in other parts of the 
country remains glaring. The lack of opportu-
nity across the country has provoked spectacular 
growth in labor migration. At least 1,500 people 
are said to leave Nepal for work overseas every 
day, double the number ten years ago.
The 2011 census recorded an absentee popula-
tion of nearly 2 million, of whom 87 percent were 
male. Most are unskilled and semiskilled work-
ers who migrate, mainly to Malaysia and the Gulf 
states, to work in trades such as construction and 
truck driving. In the 2017–18 fiscal year, Nepal 
received remittances worth over $6.5 billion from 
its citizens employed overseas. This amounted to 
some 30 percent of gross domestic product, the 
fourth-highest proportion in the world, and three 
times the national income from tourism.
Although their country has been radically trans-
formed during the past thirty years, the people of 
Nepal continue to face many challenges—eco-
nomic, social, and environmental. An increasing 
proportion of the population lives in towns and 
cities, and agriculture is no longer the mainstay of 
the country’s economy. Indeed, young men have 
been conspicuous by their absence from many ru-
ral areas for much of the past twenty-five years—
first because they were fighting in the internal 
conflict, and more recently because they are work-
ing overseas.
Nepal’s state education system is grievously 
under resourced, especially outside the towns, and 
every family that can afford to sends its children to 
private English-medium schools. Climate change, 
most glaringly apparent in the shrinking of Hima-
layan glaciers, is bringing additional challenges. 
Water shortages are ubiquitous, especially during 
the dry winter months. The unpredictability of the 
monsoon weather system is a major problem for 
an agricultural sector dominated by the rain-fed 
cultivation of rice.
The present Nepali government clearly sees 
tourism as a potential growth area—the country’s 
spectacular landscapes and rich cultural heritage 
are among its greatest assets, and its people are 
welcoming to foreign visitors. It also views China 
as a powerful new development partner, and seeks 
the economic benefits that it believes would flow 
from greater connectivity with its northern neigh-
bor via both road and rail. But there is some public 
suspicion of China’s political influence on the gov-
ernment, especially with regard to its treatment of 
Tibetan dissidents and refugees.
Young Nepalis are, overall, healthier, more likely 
to be literate than they have ever been, and increas-
ingly networked with a global Nepali diaspora. 
They are critical of their leaders, and demanding of 
them. The longer-term sustainability of Nepal as a 
nation-state may well depend upon those leaders’ 
ability to generate enough employment opportuni-
ties for the young to make staying in Nepal a more 
attractive option than going away. Q
